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Quantitative estimates of the economic damages of climate change
usually are based on aggregate relationships linking average tem-
perature change to loss in gross domestic product (GDP). However,
there is a clear need for further detail in the regional and sectoral
dimensions of impact assessments to design and prioritize adapta-
tion strategies. New developments in regional climate modeling
and physical-impact modeling in Europe allow a better exploration
of those dimensions. This article quantiﬁes the potential conse-
quences of climate change in Europe in four market impact cat-
egories (agriculture, riverﬂoods, coastal areas, and tourism) and one
nonmarket impact (human health). The methodology integrates
a set of coherent, high-resolution climate change projections and
physical models into an economic modeling framework. We ﬁnd
that if the climate of the 2080s were to occur today, the annual loss
in household welfare in the European Union (EU) resulting from
the four market impacts would range between 0.2–1%. If the wel-
fare loss is assumed to be constant over time, climate change may
halve the EU’s annual welfare growth. Scenarios with warmer tem-
peratures and a higher rise in sea level result in more severe eco-
nomic damage. However, the results show that there are large
variations across European regions. Southern Europe, the British
Isles, and Central Europe North appear most sensitive to climate
change. Northern Europe, on the other hand, is the only regionwith
net economic beneﬁts, driven mainly by the positive effects on ag-
riculture. Coastal systems, agriculture, and river ﬂooding are the
most important of the four market impacts assessed.
climate adaptation policy | climate impact and adaptation assessment |
integrated assessment model | computable general equilibrium
Adaptation is becoming a key issue of post-2012 internationalclimate policy negotiations. The December 2009 Copenha-
gen Accord (1) establishes that by 2020 developed countries will
provide US$ 100 billion per year to address the needs of de-
veloping countries, including funding for adaptation. Indeed,
even ambitious mitigation policies [e.g., the 2 °C target proposed
by the European Union (EU) and endorsed by the G8 (2, 3)] will
need to be complemented by adaptation strategies to lessen the
impact of residual warming (4). Europe is preparing for a co-
ordinated adaptation climate strategy from 2013, as set out in the
European Commission White Paper on Adaptation (5). One of its
main conclusions is that much still is unknown about the potential
impacts of climate change on the European economy as a whole
or with respect to different economic sectors and geographical
regions of Europe (6–9).
The quantitative assessment of the economic impacts of climate
change is vital for justifying strategies to curb global warming and
minimize detrimental consequences. Evaluating the effects of
climate change in the very long term is an extremely complex issue
because of incomplete scientiﬁc methodologies and data gaps.
For this reason, the assessment must account for themany sources
of uncertainty, including future climate, demographic change,
economic development, and technological change.
Most studies (e.g., 10–15) have focused on climate damage
functions as reduced-form formulations linking climate variables
to economic impacts [usually average global temperature to
gross domestic product (GDP)]. Nevertheless, such a top-down
approach is unsatisfactory for the following reasons: Damage
estimates often are derived from the literature, thus originating
from different and possibly inconsistent climate scenarios. They
also lack the necessary geographical resolution for assessing re-
gional impacts and prioritizing adaptation policies. Moreover,
only the average temperature and precipitation usually are in-
cluded, ignoring other moments of the probabilistic distribution
and other relevant climate variables.
We present here a high-resolution, regionally focused, and
integrated assessment of the physical and economic effects of
climate change in Europe. The analysis is innovative because it
integrates (i) climate data with high space–time resolution; (ii)
detailed modeling tools speciﬁc for each impact category con-
sidered; and (iii) a multisectoral, multiregional economic model.
The appraisal presented herein builds on examples of assess-
ments made elsewhere (e.g., for the United States, see refs. 16–
20; for a global assessment, see ref. 21).
Five impact categories have been addressed in this study: ag-
riculture, river basins, coastal systems, tourism, and human
health. These ﬁve aspects are highly sensitive to changes in mean
climate and climate extremes. For this study the EU has been
divided into ﬁve regions to simplify interpretation (Fig. S1):
Northern Europe, the British Isles, Central Europe North, Cen-
tral Europe South, and Southern Europe.
Methodological Framework
The consistent methodological framework that integrates the
climate data, physical-impact models, and economic models is
shown in Fig. S2. In the ﬁrst stage, daily and 50-km resolution
climate data are obtained from climate models. In the second
stage, these data are used as input to run the ﬁve physical-impact
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models. (See SI Text for detailed explanations on the models and
Table S1 for their speciﬁc climate data input.)
In the third stage, the physical-impact models and their as-
sociated direct economic effects are introduced into a multi-
sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (22),
General Equilibrium Model for Energy-Economy-Environment
Interactions (GEM-E3 Europe), which models most EU coun-
tries individually.
This study has other distinctive features. We have modeled the
economic effects of future climate change (projected for the
2080s) on the current economy as of 2010. Several authors have
followed this approach (e.g., 23). This quasi-static analysis would
be the equivalent of having the 2080s climate in today’s economy.
The alternative approach (followed, e.g., in ref. 24) would be to
model the effect of the future climate on the future economy.
Implementing a static approach has the advantage that hypothe-
ses on the future evolution of the economy over the next eight
decades are not needed, thereby minimizing the number of
assumptions. Moreover, the interpretation of the results becomes
simpler.Within this quasi-static economicmetrics, we also present
undiscounted impacts. Time discounting is a key and controversial
issue in evaluating the impacts of climate change (25, 26).
A baseline scenario has been run for 2010 assuming no climate
change. The alternative scenario considered the inﬂuence of
climate change in the economy. The results presented compare
the values of welfare and GDP of the climate scenario with those
of the baseline scenario.
This study also has estimated “potential impacts” (27), which
do not consider public adaptation policies. The assessment of
potential impacts in various sectors facilitates the identiﬁcation
of priorities in public adaptation policies. In the models applied
in this analysis, only private adaptation actions have been taken
into account (e.g., farm level adaptation in agriculture), but no
new explicit public adaptation policies have been considered.
Although the coastal systems DIVA model uses a more so-
phisticated cost–beneﬁt framework to determine the optimal
level of adaptation, in this study, this option has been disabled
to measure the potential impact of sea-level rise (SLR).
Scenarios. We have considered four climate futures for the 2080s
(Table 1) to reﬂect the uncertainty associated with the driving
forces of global emissions and the response of climate to green-
house gas (GHG) concentration. Two global socioeconomic
scenarios have been selected from the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Sce-
narios (SRES) (28): the high-emissionA2 scenario and the lower-
emission B2 scenario (CO2 concentration of 709 ppm and 560
ppm by the end of this century, respectively). For each SRES
scenario, climate output from two state-of-the-art regional cli-
mate models (RCMs), nested within a global climate model
(GCM), have been selected from the Prediction of Regional
Scenarios and Uncertainties for Deﬁning European Climate
Change Risks and Effects (PRUDENCE) project (29). Daily
RCM output at 50-km resolution has been used to drive the
physical-impact models. In the following, all climate change
numbers refer to a comparison of the 30-y periods 1961–1990
and 2071–2100.
Temperature and Precipitation. The scenarios considered lead to
an average temperature increase in Europe between 2.5 °C and
5.4 °C (Table 1). These ﬁgures depend on the GHG emission sce-
nario chosen and the climate model used (temperature and pre-
cipitation maps appear in Figs. S3 and S4). Hereafter, the climate
futures are called “scenarios” and are distinguished by the EU
temperature increase: 2.5 °C (B2 HadAM3-HIRHAM), 3.9 °C
(A2 HadAM3-HIRHAM), 4.1 °C (B2 ECHAM4-RCAO), and
5.4 °C (A2 ECHAM4-RCAO). Northern Europe is the area with
the highest temperature increase in the 2.5 °C and 3.9 °C sce-
narios, whereas in the 4.1 °C and 5.4 °C scenarios, Central Europe
South and Southern Europe would experience the largest tem-
perature increase. The more oceanic British Isles have the lowest
temperature increase throughout all scenarios. The global tem-
perature increase of the scenarios is in the range of 2.3–3.1 °C.
One A2 simulation shows lower warming than one of the B2
simulations; it should be kept in mind that modeled projections of
regional climate change have a larger spread than projections of
global change.
The regional precipitation pattern is similar in all scenarios.
The Central Europe South and Southern Europe regions would
experience annual decreases compared with the 1961–1990 con-
trol period, whereas most other EU regions would have posi-
tive precipitation changes in all scenarios but with large seasonal
differences.
Sea-Level Rise. According to the IPCC (30, 31), the uncertainty
range of the projected SLR is wide. Given recent evidence
on accelerated SLR (32), we consider only the high-climate-
sensitivity case. This case leads to a global SLR in the range of
49–59 cm by the end of the century (Table 1). The high range of
SLR of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), 88 cm, also
has been studied for the coastal system impact as a variant of the
5.4 °C scenario.
Results
Agriculture. Because the production and quality of cultivated
crops and their use of water are inﬂuenced directly by local
climate variables and atmospheric CO2, agriculture is particu-
larly susceptible to climate change (33–36). Agriculture is the
main user of land and water and still plays a dominant economic
role in many rural areas of Europe. Previous studies have shown
that the stress imposed by climate change on agriculture will
intensify the regional disparities between European countries
(7, 8, 14).
We investigated the response of the distribution of premium
and productivity of crops in Europe to potential climate change
induced by increased GHG forcing. The assessment linked bio-
physical and statistical models in a rigorous and testable method-
ology, based on the current understanding of processes of crop
growth and development, to quantify crop responses to changing
climate conditions.
We found that the 2080s climate would have a rather dramatic
spatial agricultural effect and a serious impact on aggregated
regional production (Table 2). In the 2080s the scenarios of lower
warming could lead to small changes in EU yields, whereas the
5.4 °C scenario could mean a reduction in crop yields by 10%. All
Table 1. Summary of socioeconomic and climate scenarios
Scenario
2.5 °C 3.9 °C 4.1 °C 5.4 °C
World population in 2100 (1012) 10.4 15.1 10.4 15.1
World GDP in 2100 (1012, 1990 US$) 235 243 235 243
CO2 concentration (ppm) 561 709 561 709
Δ Temperature (°C)*
World 2.4 3.1 2.3 3.1
EU† 2.5 3.9 4.1 5.4
Southern Europe 2.6 4.1 4.3 5.6
Central Europe South 2.4 3.9 4.4 6.0
Central Europe North 2.3 3.7 4.0 5.5
British Isles 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.9
Northern Europe 2.9 4.1 3.6 4.7
Δ Precipitation (%)*
EU† 1 −2 2 −6
Southern Europe −7 −15 −13 −28
Central Europe South 2 −2 −4 −16
Central Europe North 3 1 6 −1
British Isles −5 −2 10 5
Northern Europe 10 10 19 24
Sea level rise (high climate
sensitivity) (cm)
49 56 51 59
*Increase in the period 2071–2100 compared with 1961–1990.
†European regions: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and
Bulgaria), Central Europe South (France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia), Central Europe North (Belgium, The Neth-
erlands, Germany, and Poland), British Isles (Ireland and United Kingdom),
and Northern Europe (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).
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2080s scenarios show considerable regional disparities in impacts
on agriculture. Southern Europe would experience yield losses
that would become relatively high under the 5.4 °C scenario—
about 25%. The Central Europe regions would experience
moderate changes in yield. In all scenarios Northern Europe
would beneﬁt from positive yield changes, and, to a lesser extent,
the British Isles would beneﬁt in the 4.1 °C and 5.4 °C scenarios.
These effects result from the dominance of the longer growing
season. A group of countries (e.g., Ireland, Belgium, Germany,
France and the Netherlands) may be at risk if limitations on the
use of fertilizers in agriculture are considered. Romania would
experience higher potential gain, partly because of the consid-
erable weight of agriculture in its economy.
River Floods. River ﬂoods are the most common natural disaster
in Europe (37), resulting in large economic losses through direct
damage to infrastructure, property, and agricultural land and
through indirect losses within ﬂooded areas and beyond. The
costs arising from ﬂoods have increased rapidly during the last
decades, although the observed upward trend in ﬂood damage
can be attributed largely to socioeconomic factors (38). Global
warming generally is expected to increase the magnitude and
frequency of extreme precipitation events (39, 40), which may
lead to more intense and more frequent river ﬂoods.
Estimates of changes in the frequency and severity of river
ﬂoods are based on simulations using the LISFLOOD hydro-
logical model (41). This model has been developed for oper-
ational ﬂood forecasting at the European scale and is a
combination of a grid-based water-balance model and a one-
dimensional hydrodynamic channel ﬂow-routing model. Because
it is spatially distributed, the model can take account of the
spatial variation in land use, soil properties, and climate varia-
bles. The LISFLOOD model transfers the climate-forcing data
(temperature, precipitation, radiation, wind-speed, and humid-
ity) into estimates of river runoff. By using extreme value anal-
ysis, changes in ﬂood magnitude at different return periods are
derived (42). From the calculated ﬂood inundation depths,
expected annual economic damage and the population exposed
are estimated using country-speciﬁc ﬂood depth–damage func-
tions, information on land use, and data on population density.
The projections assume no growth in exposed values and pop-
ulation or adjustments of current ﬂood protection standards and
hence consider only the effects of climate change on ﬂood risk.
River ﬂooding would affect 250,000–400,000 additional people
per year in Europe by the 2080s (Table 2). The increase in direct
damage from river ﬂoods in the 2080s ranges from €7.7 billion to
€15 billion, more than doubling the annual average damages
during the period 1961–1990. In general, the higher the mean
temperature increase, the higher are the projected increase in
people exposed to ﬂoods and the expected damages. The impacts
at the regional level vary substantially, deviating strongly from
the EU average. Flood damages and people affected are pro-
jected to increase across much of Western Europe, the British
Isles, and the Central Europe regions. Decreases in ﬂood damage
are projected consistently for northeastern parts of Europe be-
cause of a reduction in spring snowmelt ﬂoods.
Coastal Systems. Coastal regions are areas where wealth and
population are concentrated and are undergoing rapid increases
in population and urbanization (43, 44). SLR is a direct threat
to productive infrastructures and to the residential and natural
heritage zones.
The bottom-up coast assessment is based on the Dynamic and
Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) tool, an integrated
impact–adaptationmodel allowing interaction between a series of
biophysical and socioeconomic modules to assess the impacts of
SLR (45). A major weakness of earlier studies is that they exam-
ined only a subset of the physical consequences of SLR; DIVA
allows all the major direct impacts of SLR to be evaluated
quantitatively in physical terms. These effects include (i) direct
impacts on erosion, (ii) increased ﬂood risk and inundation, (iii)
coastal wetland loss and change, and (iv) surface salinization.
Adaptation is an explicit part of the model, and the beneﬁts of
a range of homogenous adaptation options can be explored to-
gether with their costs, including options from no protection
to total protection, together with intermediate options which
characterize more realistic adaptation responses in the context
of Europe.
The number of people annually affected by sea ﬂoods in the
reference year (1995) is estimated to be 36,000. Without adap-
tation, the number of people affected annually by ﬂooding in the
2080s increases signiﬁcantly in all scenarios and ranges from
775,000–5.5 million people (Table 2). The British Isles, Central
Europe North, and Southern Europe are the areas potentially
most affected by coastal ﬂoods. However, when adaptation (dikes
and beach nourishment) is taken into account, the number of
people potentially exposed to ﬂoods is reduced signiﬁcantly.
The economic costs to people who might migrate because of
land loss (through submergence and erosion) also increases
substantially under a high rate of SLR, assuming no adaptation,
and the costs increase over time. When adaptation measures are
implemented, this displacement of people becomes a minor
impact. This result indicates the important beneﬁt of adaptation
to coastal populations affected by SLR.
Tourism. Tourism is a major economic sector in Europe, with the
current annual ﬂow of tourists from Northern to Southern
Europe accounting for one in every six tourist arrivals in the
world (46). Climate change has the potential to alter tourism
patterns in Europe radically by inducing changes in destinations
and seasonal demand structure (47).
Table 2. Physical annual impacts in agriculture, river basins,
coastal systems, and tourism of 2080s climate-change scenarios
in the current European economy
Physical impacts
European regions*
Southern
Europe
Central
Europe
South
Central
Europe
North
British
Isles
Northern
Europe EU
Physical impacts as estimated by the agriculture model
Yield change (%)†
2.5 °C 0 5 −1 −9 37 3
3.9 °C −12 5 −3 −11 39 −2
4.1 °C −4 3 2 15 36 3
5.4 °C −27 −3 −8 19 52 −10
Physical impacts as estimated by the river ﬂooding model
People affected (1,000s/y)‡
2.5 °C 46 117 103 12 −2 276
3.9 °C 49 101 110 48 9 318
4.1 °C 9 84 119 43 −4 251
5.4 °C −4 125 198 79 −3 396
Physical impacts as estimated by the coastal systems model
People ﬂooded (1,000s/y)§
2.5 °C 258 82 345 70 20 775
3.9 °C 456 144 450 136 40 1,225
4.1 °C 313 85 347 86 20 851
5.4 °C 474 158 459 207 56 1,353
5.4 °C, 88 cm SLR 1,091 512 2,398 1,279 272 5,552
Physical impacts as estimated by the tourism model
Bed nights change (%)¶
2.5 °C −1 2 2 3 4 1
3.9 °C −1 3 3 4 6 1
4.1 °C −2 14 13 14 20 6
5.4 °C −4 17 16 18 25 7
*European regions: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and
Bulgaria), Central Europe South (France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia), Central Europe North (Belgium, The Neth-
erlands, Germany, and Poland), British Isles (Ireland and United Kingdom),
and Northern Europe (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).
†Yield changes compared with 1961–1990 period and weighted by the coun-
try agriculture value added.
‡Differences compared with the 1961–1990 period.
§Differences compared with 1995.
¶Differences compared with 2005.
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The tourism study simulated the major outdoor international
tourism ﬂows within Europe. The study represents an improve-
ment on earlier work because it integrates the climate component
of tourist activity (climate suitability was expressed with the
tourism climate index, see ref. 48) with the economic analysis of
tourist demand ﬂows, considering also seasonality effects in a
tourist regional demand model.
For the 2080s, the distribution of climatic conditions in Europe
is projected to change signiﬁcantly. For the spring season, all
climate model results show a clear extension toward the north of
the zone under good conditions. Excellent conditions in spring,
which are found mainly in Spain in the baseline period, could
spread across most of the Mediterranean coastal areas by the
2080s. Changes in autumn are comparable to the ones in spring.
In summer, the zone of good conditions also expands toward the
north but at the expense of the south, where climatic conditions
would deteriorate. These results match the ﬁndings of earlier
studies into the impact of climate change on climate suitability
for tourism (e.g., 49).
Southern Europe, which currently accounts for more than half
of the total EU capacity of tourist accommodation, could be the
only region with a decline in bed nights, estimated to range be-
tween 1% and 4% depending on the climate scenario (Table 2).
The rest of Europe is projected to have large increases in bed
nights, in the range of 15–25% for the two warmest scenarios.
The changes in bed nights caused by changing climate conditions
can be estimated econometrically, leading to changes in expen-
diture associated with bed nights. In all climate scenarios there
would be additional expenditures, with a relatively small EU-
wide positive impact of €4–18 billion, depending on the scenario
and climate model used.
A key assumption is that the tourism system has full ﬂexibility
in responding to climate change. Climate change can affect
overall demand, and the seasonal distribution of tourists is de-
termined exclusively by climate factors. However, if institutional
factors (e.g., school holidays) limit that seasonal ﬂexibility, results
could be quite different. In that case, for example, Southern
Europe might not be able to compensate for the summer losses
with gains in the shoulder seasons.
Human Health. Climate change has a range of complex inter-
linkages with health (50), including direct impacts, such as
temperature-related illness and death and the health impacts of
extreme weather events. Other impacts follow more indirect
pathways, such as those that give rise to water- and food-borne
diseases, vector-borne diseases, or food and water shortages.
There is a direct relationship between mortality and temper-
ature that differs by climatic zone and geographical area (51).
High ambient temperature is associated with mortality from heat
stroke and also illnesses (e.g., cardiovascular diseases). However,
rising temperatures also reduce winter excess deaths. The pro-
jections of the impacts of climate change on heat-related and
cold-related mortality were based on empirical relationships
between mortality and current temperature (51–53). The study
used daily projected temperature information at a 50-km grid
resolution across Europe, combined with country-speciﬁc data
from socioeconomic scenarios for population and age structure
and with background health incidence data for both current and
future periods. Impacts were estimated using temperature-
response functions, which provide relationships between daily
mortality and daily temperature. These functions usually are
represented as separate functions for heat and cold effects,
reﬂecting the fact that mortality increases at low or high tem-
peratures above certain threshold levels, i.e., around a broad
central range over which there is little response.
In the 2080s, without adaptation measures and physiological
acclimatization, the effect of heat- and cold-related mortality
changes depends on the set of exposure-response functions used.
The range of estimates for the annual increase in mortality
(caused by heat and without acclimatization) is between 60,000
and 165,000. Physiological and behavioral responses to the
warmer climate would have a very signiﬁcant effect in reducing
this mortality, potentially reducing the estimates by a factor of
ﬁve. The range of estimates for the decrease in cold-related
mortality is between 60,000 and 250,000, although there also may
be a decline in the sensitivity ofmortality to cold. It is notable that,
in aggregate, the decreases in cold-related mortality may out-
weigh the increases in heat-related mortality. This result can be
understood because, based on the impact functions used in the
study, the current baseline climate of Europe is associated with
more deaths in the winter than in the summer. The cold- and heat-
related impacts are estimated using simple epidemiologically
derived functions for daily mortality; however, there are impor-
tant differences in the impact pathways, linkages with morbidity,
exposure patterns, and other determinants between the heat- and
cold-related deaths.
Impact on the Overall Economy. The consequences of climate
change on the four market impact categories (agriculture, river
ﬂoods, coastal systems, and tourism) can be valued in monetary
terms because they directly affect sectoral markets and—via the
cross-sector linkages—the overall economy. They also inﬂuence
the consumption behavior of households and therefore house-
hold welfare.
If the climate of the 2080s occurred today, the annual damage
of climate change to the EU economy in terms of GDP loss is
estimated to be between €20 billion for the 2.5 °C scenario and
€65 billion for the 5.4 °C scenario with high SLR (Fig. 1).
However, the damages expressed in GDP loss underestimate
the actual losses. For instance, the repair of damage to buildings
caused by river ﬂoods increases production (GDP), because it
represents a kind of obliged consumption, but does not improve
consumer welfare. (Table S2 details the changes in GDP and
welfare for all scenarios and market impact categories.) The ag-
gregated impact on the four categories would lead to an EU
annual welfare loss between 0.2% for the 2.5 °C scenario and 1%
for the 5.4 °C scenario with a high SLR (88 cm) (Fig. 2). The long-
term historic EU annual growth of welfare is around 2%. As-
suming that the annual loss is constant over time, climate change
would reduce the annual welfare growth by between 0.2%
and 1%.
EU-aggregated economic impact ﬁgures hide a high variation
across regions, climate scenarios, and impact categories. In all
2080s scenarios, most regions would undergo welfare losses, with
the exception of Northern Europe, where gains in a range of 0.5–
0.8% per year are driven largely by the improvement in agricul-
tural yields. Southern Europe would be severely affected by cli-
mate change, with annual welfare losses of around 1.4% for the
5.4 °C scenario.
The sectoral and geographical decomposition of welfare
changes under the 2.5 °C scenario shows that aggregated Eu-
ropean costs of climate change are much higher for agriculture,
river ﬂooding, and coastal systems than for tourism (Fig. 3). The
British Isles, Central Europe North, and Southern Europe ap-
-10,000 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000
2.5°C
3.9°C
4.1°C
5.4°C
5.4°C, 
88 cm SLR
GDP Loss (EUR million)
EU
Northern Europe
British Isles
Central Europe North
Central Europe South
Southern Europe
Fig. 1. Annual impact of 2080s climate-change scenarios in terms of GDP loss
(in million €). The scenarios are identiﬁed by the average EU temperature
increase, although temperature is not the only determinant of economic
impacts. Impacts are determined by the combination of SRES socioeconomic
scenarios and data, the associated emissions scenarios, and the use of alter-
native climate models, leading to different spatial patterns of the climate
variables. These factors explain why, for example, the economic costs are
higher in the EU overall and in most regions under the 3.9°C scenario than
under the 4.1°C scenario.
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pear to be the most sensitive areas. Moreover, moving from
a European climate scenario of 2.5 °C to one of 3.9 °C aggra-
vates the three noted impacts in almost all European regions. In
the Northern Europe area these impacts are offset by the
increasingly positive effects on agriculture.
The 5.4 °C scenario would lead to an annual EU welfare loss
of 0.7%, with more pronounced impacts in most sectors in all
EU regions. The agricultural sector is the most important
impact category in the EU average, as was found in the United
States (17). The signiﬁcant damages in Southern Europe and
Central Europe South are not compensated by the gains in
Northern Europe. Impacts from river ﬂooding also are more
important in this case than in the other scenarios, with par-
ticular aggravation in the British Isles and in Central Europe.
In the 5.4 °C scenario with the high SLR (88 cm) variant, which
would lead to a 1% annual welfare loss in the EU, coastal sys-
tems would become the most important impact category, es-
pecially in the British Isles.
Discussion
This study has aimed to estimate the regional distributional im-
plications of climate change in Europe, beyond aggregate im-
pact estimates. We illustrated the feasibility of integrating the
relevant scientiﬁc disciplines in an “end-to-end” way, ultimately
providing estimates of physical and socioeconomic impacts on
the sectoral and geographical scales relevant to the current
debate on adaptation in the EU. This multidisciplinary assess-
ment represents an improvement on monodisciplinary assess-
ments (54).
Regarding the lessons learned, one key decision concerns the
careful selection of climate scenarios, taking into account the
data needed by impacts modelers and the desirability of work-
ing with state-of-art climate models while being aware of the vari-
ability of climate model data for the same underlying socio-
economic scenario. Making such a decision requires scientiﬁc
coordination actively involving all impacts-modeling teams as well
as climate experts.
Despite the breadth and depth of this study, the results still
may be viewed as indicative or merely illustrative because both
the issue and the proposed methodology are complex and sub-
ject to many caveats and uncertainties. Uncertainties are pres-
ent in all models of the integrated assessment, both in their
input and structural speciﬁcation. The socioeconomic scenarios
driving GHG emissions, the sensitivity of the climate models to
GHG concentrations, the speciﬁc physical-impact models, and
the assumptions regarding economic valuation are all subject to
uncertainty, and all are key in inﬂuencing the ﬁnal results.
Adaptation has been modeled to various degrees in the im-
pact models, because the cost–beneﬁt analysis of adaptation
strategies is not achievable currently on a European scale.
Earlier assessments for the coastal systems indicate that adap-
tation policies could be particularly cost efﬁcient for this sec-
tor (55).
The coverage of impact categories has some limitations, be-
cause it does not consider potentially important impacts (e.g., on
forestry and transport and energy systems, migration phenom-
ena, and biodiversity losses). The effects caused by climate
extremes such as heat waves, storms, and droughts have not been
considered explicitly, nor have major economic damages caused
by low-probability high-impact events (such as collapse or slow-
down of the thermohaline circulation). Furthermore, possible
intersectoral effects, which often lead to greater vulnerabilities,
are not considered. Thus, this study possibly underestimates the
climate impacts on the EU economy.
The next steps in the research agenda consist of the ex-
tension of the impact coverage to include nonmarket effects,
weather extremes and catastrophic impacts, the modeling of
cross-sectoral effects, the cost–beneﬁt analysis of adaptation,
the use of dynamic land-use scenarios, and a probabilistic
assessment of impacts. Equity issues also could be considered
more explicitly and going beyond the standard efﬁciency
analysis by identifying winners and losers in the space and
time resolution of the adaptation assessment.
Despite the quasi-static modeling framework of this appli-
cation, impacts can be interpreted genuinely in annual terms,
because the physical-impact models deliver results on a year-
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by-year basis. Assessing the impacts on long-term economic
growth would require a truly dynamic multisectoral approach,
simulating the economy and climate change to the end of this
century and speciﬁcally dedicated to addressing the issues
missing in the present analysis, such as capital spillovers and
path-dependent effects. Such a dynamic setup also would al-
low a better analysis of the times scales of change of adapta-
tion policy.
In conclusion, there seems to be a need to improve the con-
ceptual framework underlying the multidisciplinary assessment
of climate impacts and adaptation, particularly by better in-
tegrating the different disciplines in a consistent way, e.g., over-
coming the limitations of the standard cost–beneﬁt analysis to
include fat-tailed uncertainty (56).
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